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CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES AND THE SEARCH 
FOR THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Lucas Henry Funk* 
 
ABSTRACT—Every Fourth Amendment analysis begins with the threshold 
inquiry of whether there has been a search or seizure. But answering what 
constitutes a “search” for the purposes of the Amendment has shown to be a 
difficult task. This is especially so in a world that is constantly changing by 
way of technology. Since the Amendment was written, both the capabilities 
of law enforcement as well as the private and commercial use of information 
have drastically transformed. For that reason, the doctrine has evolved 
substantially. Search criterion has shifted from physical trespass to 
reasonable expectations of privacy. Further, no such expectation exists in 
information that one knowingly reveals to a third party. But, in the Digital 
Age, these principles suffer from lack of clarity. Carpenter v. United States 
was the most recent confluence of the Fourth Amendment and technology, 
wherein the Supreme Court held that a search occurs when the Government 
obtains a user’s cell site location information. This note analyzes that case, 
as well as historic and contemporary search doctrine. Ultimately, this Note 
argues that search questions—even those implicating technology—are best 
answered by applying the Amendment as written. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an early episode of West Wing, President Bartlet ruminates over who 
will be his first nomination to the Supreme Court.1 The President is set to 
pick Judge Peyton Cabot Harrison III until Sam Seaborn, Deputy White 
House Communications Director, discovers a wrinkle: Judge Harrison 
authored an unsigned law review note in law school, wherein he explained 
that the Constitution does not provide for a generalized right to privacy. To 
him, the text did no such thing.2 A meeting in the Oval Office follows, at 
which the President and company are disheartened to learn that Judge 
Harrison still holds that view and refuses to part from it.3 
After the meeting comes to a sour end, Sam urges the President on the 
importance of the matter: 
It’s about the next 20 years; ’20s and ’30s, it was about the role of government; 
’50s and ’60s, it was civil rights; the next two decades are going to be privacy. 
I’m talking about the internet. I’m talking about cell phones. I’m talking about 
health records, and who’s gay and who’s not. And moreover, in a country born 
on the will to be free, what could be more fundamental than this?4 
Indeed, Sam’s speech was as American as baseball, hotdogs, apple pie and 
Chevrolet. But was Sam’s speech more than good, patriotic television? Was 
it good constitutional law? 
Sam did hit the nail on the head in at least one respect: it is about cell 
phones. At least it was in Carpenter v. United States,5 the Supreme Court’s 
latest significant dive into Fourth Amendment-search jurisprudence—an 
area of law marked by persistent confusion, and thus, the target of frequent 
and harsh scholarly criticism. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that 
 
 * Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, J.D., 2020. 
 1 West Wing: The Short List (NBC television broadcast Nov. 24, 1999). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id.; see also West Wing - Short List - Supreme Court and Constitution, YOUTUBE (Feb. 20, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GaEBXmeaXbI [https://perma.cc/E66P-MQUM] (advance video to 
3:36). 
 5 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
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Carpenter was high-profile and hotly discussed.6 Prior to Carpenter, various 
models of Fourth Amendment interpretation had been suggested, and surely 
post-Carpenter, more will follow. But the Court declined to adopt any such 
models, emphasizing the narrowness of its holding.7 Those who understand 
justice as a virtue with a slow and steady developmental pace may appreciate 
this move, and even more observers—conservative and liberal alike—can 
appreciate the normative outcome in light of a prevailing taste for privacy 
against government intrusion. Conversely, others may have been frustrated 
by the thin decision, hoping for the Court to once-and-for-all clarify the field 
by announcing a clear and coherent analytical framework for determining 
when a Fourth Amendment search has occurred. 
Regardless, the topic’s importance cannot be gainsaid. Whether or not 
a search has occurred in a given case is the threshold matter that determines 
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the government’s conduct at all. 
If a search (or seizure) has not occurred, such conduct is freed from the 
Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements.8 
In this Note, I will survey Fourth Amendment law generally up until 
Carpenter and then describe Carpenter’s holding. That will include a 
summary of the Fourth Amendment’s original property-based notions, the 
Katz test, and the third-party doctrine. Along the way, I will mention some 
criticisms of each. Next, I will list two noteworthy alternative approaches to 
the Fourth Amendment that have been suggested by scholars. Finally, I will 
conclude by making (what I hope is) a series of unextraordinary suggestions: 
that the role of the Court is to say what the law is, notwithstanding 
externalities and desirable normative outcomes; and that the Court should 
first determine what the Fourth Amendment’s text means, then apply it as 
such. But here is the (perhaps) extraordinary suggestion: if, after that 
exercise, judges, scholars, and citizens alike are displeased with the real-
world results, the answer should not be permitting life-tenured, politically 
unaccountable judges to engage in a nebulous, open-ended determination of 
what they perceive as reasonable, or participate in judicial updating to the 
 
 6 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Four Thoughts on the Briefing in Carpenter v. United States, LAWFARE (Nov. 
17, 2017, 3:06 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/four-thoughts-briefing-carpenter-v-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/SF4M-JQXP]; National Constitution Center, Does the Warrantless Search and Seizure 
of Cellphone Records Violate the Fourth Amendment?, YOUTUBE (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=hW32k7x7zE0 [https://perma.cc/2KSV-DKQF]; Brent Skorup & Melody Calkins, A 
Supreme Court Call on the Third Party Doctrine, WASH. TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/27/fourth-amendment-should-apply-to-phone-data/ [https://perma
.cc/YQY7-HXCU]. 
 7 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 8 Probable cause and the warrant requirement are outside the scope of this article. The narrow focus 
herein is how courts should determine when a search has occurred for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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extent that they find it necessary. It should be to amend the text, or rely on 
the people’s elected representatives to supplement it through legislation, 
because that is the only way to preserve the integrity of our system of 
carefully disbursed powers. 
I. THE ORIGINAL, PROPERTY-BASED FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”9 Up until Katz v. United States10 in 1967, the Fourth Amendment’s 
interpretive lens was property rights.11 Colonists in the second half of the 
1700s, fed up with King George III’s abuses, considered paramount the 
enshrinement of a right against unreasonable searches and seizures.12 Such a 
right was found in several state constitutions with language nearly identical 
to what would become the Fourth Amendment.13 
Some scholars contend that, for a variety of reasons, it is difficult to say 
what the founding generation understood the word “search” to mean, and 
suggest that its meaning is best understood through the analysis of search 
and seizure cases that shortly preceded the Fourth Amendment.14 These cases 
typically involved “physical entries into homes, violent rummaging for 
incriminating items once inside, and then arrests and the taking away of 
evidence found.”15 An early case called Wilkes v. Wood16 suggested that 
“[f]orcing open a house and breaking open desks was a search, while 
grabbing the papers and removing them was a seizure.”17 Another named 
Entick v. Carrington18 indicated that “[s]earches referred to the forcing open 
of persons’ houses and the breaking open of their desks and cabinets in an 
effort to find the evidence inside.”19 
This theme continued into the ratification conventions. For instance, 
Patrick Henry, during Virginia’s convention, argued against ratification 
partly because the Constitution did not contain any protection against 
 
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 10 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 11 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case 
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004) (“It is generally agreed that before the 1960s, the Fourth 
Amendment was focused on the protection of property rights against government interference.”). 
 12 Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70. 
 13 Id. at 70–71. 
 14 Id. at 72. 
 15 Id. 
 16 (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (KB). 
 17 Kerr, supra note 12, at 72. 
 18 (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807; 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (KB). 
 19 Kerr, supra note 12, at 72–73. 
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unreasonable searches and seizures.20 He expressed concern that federal 
officials seeking to enforce excise taxes could “go into your cellars and 
rooms, and search, ransack and measure, everything you eat, drink and 
wear.”21 Reflecting a property-focused understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment, Boyd v. United States22 explained that the “great end for which 
men entered into society was to secure their property.”23 The same 
understanding is found in Olmstead v. United States.24 There, the Supreme 
Court held that wiretapping was not a search or seizure because it did not 
violate Olmstead’s property rights.25 In the language of the Court, “[t]here 
was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”26 In dissent, Justice 
Brandeis argued that “every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon 
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”27 In this way, Justice Brandeis was 
before his time, as the move from property to privacy did not become en 
vogue until sometime later. 
Notwithstanding a doctrinal shift that occurred in the mid-20th century, 
at least some form of Entick’s property understanding is still alive today, 
evidenced in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in United States v. Jones28: 
Our law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot 
upon his neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, 
though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, 
he must justify it by law.29 
 
 20 Id. at 73. 
 21 Patrick Henry, Debates, the Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), in Ratification of the 
Constitution by the States: Virginia (3), 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 1331 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993). Henry asked “Suppose an 
exciseman will demand leave to enter your cellar or house, by virtue of his office; perhaps he may call 
on the militia to enable him to go. If Congress be informed of it, will they give you redress?” Id. at 1301. 
While this inquiry is surely less famous than Henry’s most famous exclamation—”Give me liberty or 
give me death!”—it is valuable insight into what the founding generation thought the Fourth Amendment 
meant. See Evan Andrews, Patrick Henry’s “Liberty or Death” Speech, HISTORY (Mar. 22, 2015), 
https://www.history.com/news/patrick-henrys-liberty-or-death-speech-240-years-ago [https://perma.cc
/G27V-H96G]. 
 22 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 23 Id. at 627 (quoting Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1066). 
 24 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 25 Id. at 464. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 28 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 29 Id. at 405 (quoting Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817). 
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II. THE KATZ TEST 
Some forty years after Olmstead, the Supreme Court announced what 
would become a landmark decision in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—
Katz v. United States30—in which Charles Katz was charged with 
transmitting wagering information by telephone.31 FBI agents eavesdropped 
on Katz’s conversations from a telephone booth by attaching an electronic 
listening device to the outside of the booth.32 In a significant doctrinal shift, 
the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.33 
Thus, what one seeks to preserve as private, even if in a public area, may be 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.34 Therefore, the Court ruled that by 
eavesdropping on Katz’s conversations conducted inside the telephone 
booth, the government invaded Katz’s privacy.35 As such, the government’s 
actions represented a constitutionally impermissible search under the Fourth 
Amendment because the surveillance did not have the required antecedent 
justification of a warrant.36 
To no avail, the government argued that the Fourth Amendment did not 
apply because the means of surveillance did not involve any physical 
intrusion.37 The Court explained “we have since departed from the narrow 
view on which [Olmstead] rested . . . [and] have expressly held that the 
Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but 
extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard without any 
‘technical trespass under [] property law.’”38 Therefore, the Court viewed 
property concepts as no longer controlling.39 But even then, there was no talk 
of reasonable expectations in the majority opinion, only that “electronically 
listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon 
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus 
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”40 
 
 30 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 31 Id. at 348. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 351. 
 34 Id. at 351–52. 
 35 Id. at 353. 
 36 Id. at 359. 
 37 Id. at 352. 
 38 Id. at 353 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
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Rather, the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” was first used in 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence,41 which would give rise to the analytical 
framework of the Court’s Fourth Amendment-search jurisprudence for many 
years. Specifically, Justice Harlan set forth a two-prong test: “first that a 
person [must] have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize 
as ‘reasonable.’”42 
Justice Black was not impressed. In dissent, he argued that the Fourth 
Amendment simply did not bear the meaning afforded to it by the majority, 
and that it was not the proper role of the Court “to rewrite the Amendment 
in order ‘to bring it into harmony with the times’ and thus reach a result that 
many people believe to be desirable.”43 
A. Criticism of Katz 
The newly pronounced Fourth Amendment inquiry in Katz did not go 
without criticism for long, and critiques persist to the present day. Negative 
commentary rolled in as early as 1974: “Justice Harlan himself later 
expressed second thoughts about this conception, and rightly so. An actual, 
subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of 
what Katz held or in a theory of what the Fourth Amendment protects.”44 
Following are two of the most straightforward, persistent critiques. 
1. Katz is Not Faithful to the Text of the Fourth Amendment 
An obvious problem with the Katz test, assuming even marginal respect 
for the Constitution’s text, is its lack of basis in the Fourth Amendment’s 
words. After all, a short “command + f”45 will reveal that the word “privacy” 
is nowhere therein. Justice Scalia has characterized the test as “notoriously 
 
 41 See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only . . . 
that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. . . .”) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 (1914); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)). 
 42 Id. at 361. 
 43 Id. at 364 (White, J., dissenting). 
 44 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 
(1974). Amsterdam continued: 
[Subjective expectation of privacy] can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an 
individual’s claim to fourth amendment protection. If it could, the government could diminish 
each person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half hourly on television 
that 1984 was being advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under 
comprehensive electronic surveillance. . . . [N]either Katz nor the fourth amendment asks what 
we expect of government. They tell us what we should demand of government. 
Id. 
 45 Or “control + f” for those non-Mac users. 
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unhelpful” with “no plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment.”46 He went on to say: 
[The Fourth Amendment] did not guarantee some generalized “right of privacy” 
and leave it to [the Supreme] Court to determine which particular 
manifestations of the value of privacy “society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’” Rather, it enumerated (“persons, houses, papers, and effects”) the 
objects of privacy protection to which the Constitution would extend, leaving 
further expansion to the good judgment, not of this Court, but of the people 
through their representatives in the legislature.47 
Justice Thomas has similarly observed that “[t]he phrase 
‘expectation(s) of privacy’ does not appear in the pre-Katz federal or state 
case reporters, the papers of prominent Founders, early congressional 
documents and debates, collections of early American English texts, or early 
American newspapers.”48 He summarized that “[b]y defining ‘search’ to 
mean ‘any violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy,’ the Katz test 
misconstrues virtually” every word in the amendment.49 
If at this point, you are looking for the constitutional grounding of the 
Katz test, and neither the text of the amendment nor the majority or 
concurring opinions in the case provide you any answer, do not fret. Harvey 
Schneider, appellate counsel in the Katz case, experienced something of a 
revelation.50 He explained: 
I experienced a mind changing event. . . . As I ruminated about the Katz case, I 
reflected on my Torts class, especially the tort of negligence. I remembered we 
were taught that negligence was doing what a reasonable man would not do or 
failing to do what a reasonable man would do. . . . Then it hit me. We (both the 
Court and the attorneys) had it all wrong. The test for determining whether 
Katz’s communications had been constitutionally seized was not whether the 
FBI agents engaged in a trespass (a theory that the Court had already 
abandoned) or whether a public telephone booth was a constitutionally 
protected area. Rather, the test was whether a reasonable person . . . could have 
expected his communication to be private.51 
Upon release of the opinion, it was clear that the Court was sufficiently 
persuaded by Schneider’s “mind changing event,” as it had adopted his 
 
 46 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 47 Id. at 97–98 (internal citations omitted) (italics in original). In this way, it appears that Justice 
Scalia and Judge Harrison were cut from the same cloth. 
 48 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Harvey A. Schneider, Katz v. United States: The Untold Story, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 13, 
18–19 (2009). 
 51 Id. 
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suggestion as the new standard for answering whether a Fourth Amendment 
search had occurred, despite the absence of any textual or historical 
mooring.52 
I will not plunge into the minutiae surrounding theories of constitutional 
interpretation, but hopefully it is not shocking to suggest that, regardless of 
theoretical differences, any constitutional interpretive framework must 
afford at least some weight to the text. For “our peculiar security is in the 
possession of a written constitution,” and we should not “make it a blank 
paper by construction.”53 
2. Katz Requires Judges to Make Normative Decisions 
The judiciary does not properly serve any legislative function. Rather, 
it should “apply written laws to facts in cases that are actually before it.”54 
Yet the Katz test forces courts to do what is, in effect, legislation. Katz 
teaches that an expectation of privacy is actually reasonable when “the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”55 
But of course, that is impossible to do while maintaining participation in a 
neutral, legal decision-making enterprise, because the answer to the question 
of what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable “calls for the exercise 
of raw political will belonging to legislatures, not the legal judgment proper 
to courts.”56 
Even if the Court believed itself proper for making policy judgments on 
behalf of the laity, studies suggest that conflict exists between the opinion of 
the Court and that of the American people as to what is perceived as 
reasonable.57 For example, one study found that survey participants and the 
Court disagree about whether police use of undercover agents to obtain 
information violates “justifiable expectations of privacy.”58 While the Court 
 
 52 See id. at 21. 
 53 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 41 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON: 11 JULY TO 15 NOVEMBER 1803, 346, 347 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2014). 
 54 Sen. Ben Sasse, Sasse on Kavanaugh Hearing: “We Can and We Should Do Better than This”, 
BEN SASSE: PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/9
/sasse-on-kavanaugh-hearing-we-can-and-we-should-do-better-than-this [https://perma.cc/H4LD-
PXXB]. 
 55 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 56 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2265 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 57 See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and 
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732, 740–42 (1993) (“[T]he results strongly suggest that some 
of the Court’s decisions regarding the threshold of the Fourth Amendment and the warrant and probable 
cause requirements do not reflect societal understandings. Indeed, some of the Court’s conclusions in this 
regard may be well off the mark.”). 
 58 Id. at 740. 
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is convinced that one assumes the risk that a “false friend”59 will reveal 
confidences, survey participants found various types of undercover activity 
to be very intrusive.60 Along the same lines, whereas the Court has held that 
a bank depositor “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government,” survey 
participants found government perusal of bank records to be quite intrusive.61 
Consider also government conduct such as entry onto the curtilage of one’s 
home or a dog’s sniff of an individual. Where the Court has held that neither 
implicate the Fourth Amendment,62 survey participants generally found both 
actions to be as intrusive as a “frisk.”63 Perhaps this is why commentators 
have described the Katz test as “‘an unpredictable jumble,’ ‘a mass of 
contradictions and obscurities,’ ‘all over the map,’ ‘riddled with 
inconsistency and incoherence,’ ‘a series of inconsistent and bizarre results 
that the Court has left entirely undefended,’ ‘unstable,’ ‘chameleon-like,’ . . . 
‘a conclusion rather than a starting point for analysis,’ ‘distressingly 
unmanageable,’ ‘a dismal failure,’ ‘flawed to the core,’ [and] ‘unadorned 
fiat.’”64 At the end of the day, asking courts to determine what expectations 
of privacy society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, amid constantly 
changing technology, is arguably unreasonable. 
III. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 
Not long after Katz, the third-party doctrine emerged. In short, the 
doctrine says that an individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information they voluntarily share with third parties, such as a bank, phone 
 
 59 The “false friend” doctrine holds “evidence revealed to the government by a confidant of the 
defendant is admissible precisely because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such 
situations.” Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Privacy, False Friends, 
and the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. 
REV. 253, 255 (2006). 
 60 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 57, at 740. 
 61 Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
 62 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179–81 (1984) (holding that because fences and “No 
Trespassing” signs do not effectively bar the public from viewing open fields, an asserted expectation of 
privacy in open fields is not one that society recognizes as reasonable); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 707 (1983) (holding that exposure of luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog is not a search for 
Fourth Amendment purposes). 
 63 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 57, at 740–41. 
 64 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2244 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (original brackets 
removed). 
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company, or credit card company.65 It traces its roots to two cases: United 
States v. Miller66 and Smith v. Maryland.67 Explanations of each follow. 
A. Origin of the Third-Party Doctrine 
In Miller, the government charged Miller with various federal offenses, 
and he moved to suppress documentary evidence offered by the government: 
records obtained from his two bank accounts.68 The records were obtained 
via subpoena, which required the president of each bank to appear and 
produce “all records of [Miller’s] accounts, i.e., savings, checking, loan or 
otherwise.”69 The banks obliged and Miller was subsequently indicted.70 
Relying on Boyd, the court of appeals found that the government violated 
Miller’s Fourth Amendment rights by requiring the bank to produce the 
records, but the Supreme Court disagreed.71 
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, explained that “‘no interest 
legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment’ is implicated by 
governmental investigative activities unless there is an intrusion into a zone 
of privacy, into ‘the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his 
property within a constitutionally protected area.’”72 Because the records in 
this case were not within a zone of privacy, there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation.73 
But why did these records fall outside such protection? Because they 
were considered “business records of the banks.”74 The Court reasoned that 
a “depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government,” and as 
such, 
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed 
to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.75 
 
 65 Simon Stern, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Third Person, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 364, 364 
(2013). 
 66 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 67 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 68 425 U.S. at 435. 
 69 Id. at 437. 
 70 Id. at 438. 
 71 Id. at 439–40. 
 72 Id. at 440 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1966)). 
 73 Id. at 443. 
 74 Id. at 440. 
 75 Id. at 443. 
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Justice Brennan dissented, adopting the reasoning of the California 
Supreme Court.76 That Court, ruling on a state constitutional provision which 
mirrored the Fourth Amendment, explained “[i]t cannot be gainsaid that the 
customer of a bank expects that the documents, such as checks, which he 
transmits to the bank in the course of his business operations, will remain 
private, and that such an expectation is reasonable.”77 So it would seem to 
follow that “[a] bank customer’s reasonable expectation is that . . . the 
matters he reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal 
banking purposes.”78 Contemporary audiences may sympathize with Justice 
Brennan’s view, but he, like Justice Brandeis in Olmstead, was unable to 
convince his fellow justices. 
Three years later, the Supreme Court again affirmed the third-party 
doctrine in Smith. In that case, a woman was robbed and subsequently 
received phone calls by a man who claimed to be the robber.79 After being 
told by the man to go to her front porch, she recognized a vehicle passing by 
as the one that was used in connection with her robbery.80 Police then traced 
the license plate number and discovered that the car belonged to Smith.81 At 
the request of the police, Smith’s phone company attached a pen register to 
his phone that would record the numbers he dialed.82 This evidence was used 
in Smith’s eventual indictment for robbery.83 
In rejecting Smith’s argument that installation of the pen register was a 
search, the Court followed Katz’s two-step analysis.84 Justice Blackmun first 
explained that people do not retain an expectation of privacy in the numbers 
they dial, because they convey the dialed number to the phone company, who 
in turn makes records containing such information for the purposes of phone 
bills and the like.85 Next, proceeding to Katz-step two, the Court said “even 
if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers 
he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not one that society is 
 
 76 Id. at 447 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 77 Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. 1974). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 742–44. 
 85 Id. at 742. If you thought that Amsterdam may have exaggerated earlier with his suggestion that 
after Katz, the government could diminish expectations of privacy by broadcasting on national television 
that it would engage in comprehensive surveillance of every citizen, think again. Justice Blackmun took 
time to explain that “[m]ost phone books tell subscribers, on a page entitled ‘Consumer Information,’ that 
the company ‘can frequently help in identifying to the authorities the origin of unwelcome and 
troublesome calls.’” Id. at 742–43. 
17:369 (2020) Carpenter v. United States 
381 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”86 Relying on Miller, the Court 
explained “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information 
he voluntarily turns over to third parties,” because that person “assume[s] the 
risk” of disclosure.87 Smith was out of luck because “[w]hen he used his 
phone, [he] voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone 
company” and “assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police 
the numbers he dialed.”88 
B. Criticism of the Third Party-Doctrine 
Commentary of the third-party doctrine has almost unanimously 
concluded that the doctrine is “not wrong, but horribly wrong,” which is 
especially obvious to anyone familiar with modern technology.89 One 
commentator has observed that “[a] list of every article or book that has 
criticized the doctrine would make this the world’s longest law review 
footnote.”90 Indeed, some suggest that the third-party doctrine “presents one 
of the most serious threats to privacy in the digital age” because “so much of 
what we do is recorded by third parties that the [doctrine] increasingly 
renders the Fourth Amendment ineffective in protecting people’s privacy 
against government information gathering.”91 Nor is this view exclusive to 
any particular judicial philosophy or political affiliation. 
Justice Sotomayor has remarked “it may be necessary to reconsider the 
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”92 In her view, the doctrine 
is “ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks.”93 Justice Gorsuch agrees: 
Can the government demand a copy of all your e-mails from Google or 
Microsoft without implicating your Fourth Amendment rights? Can it secure 
your DNA from 23andMe without a warrant or probable cause? Smith and 
Miller say yes it can—at least without running afoul of Katz. But that result 
strikes most lawyers and judges today—me included—as pretty unlikely.94 
 
 86 Id. at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87 Id. at 743–44. 
 88 Id. at 744. 
 89 Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564 (2009). 
 90 Id. at 563 n.5. 
 91 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for 
Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 753 (2005). 
 92 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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IV. TECHNOLOGY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
If you have not noticed by now, a persistent theme is the difficulties 
presented in trying to answer when a Fourth Amendment search has occurred 
against the backdrop of our use of, and law enforcement’s access to, ever-
evolving technology. It is one thing to answer whether a search has occurred 
when the government walks through your front door, into your office, and 
rummages through your desk; it is quite another to answer whether a search 
has occurred when the government is able, via technology, to know the 
otherwise unknowable without ever stepping foot or laying a hand on your 
property. What follows are some examples of the Fourth Amendment’s 
relationship with modern(ish) technology, so the reader can get a sense of 
the difficult questions frequently presented. As an aside, before the tech 
enthusiasts riposte that the technology involved in these cases is not that 
advanced, consider that, to create doctrinal questions, technology need not 
be on the very cutting edge of the present day. It only need be something 
likely beyond the contemplation of the framers or that the Court has not 
previously considered. 
A. Fourth Amendment Cases Involving Modern Technology 
You can perhaps imagine Danny Kyllo’s surprise when he learned that 
the warrant leading to the search of his home and his eventual indictment 
was in part based upon information gathered by something called an Agema 
Thermovision 210 thermal imager, which revealed heat emanating from his 
home consistent with that of high-intensity lamps used for marijuana 
growth.95 Because the Agema Thermovision 210 was able to observe things 
that could not be observed with the naked eye, law enforcement was able to 
gather this information about Kyllo’s home in just a few moments from 
across the street.96 After the Ninth Circuit held that Kyllo’s Fourth 
Amendment rights had not been violated, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.97 
In short, the Court held that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology 
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise 
have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area, constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology 
in question is not in general public use.”98 Because the thermal imager used 
by law enforcement in this case did just that, absent a warrant, an unlawful 
 
 95 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001). 
 96 Id. at 29–30. 
 97 Id. at 31. 
 98 Id. at 34 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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search had occurred.99 Justice Scalia, anticipating the difficulties that would 
persist in the technological age, explained, “[w]hile the technology used in 
the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of 
more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”100 One 
commentator, responding to the “not in general use” language in the opinion, 
seemed to give a nod to Amsterdam’s earlier retort to the Katz test: “Would 
the widespread sale of cheap Ronco combo pocket-thermal-imagers-’n’-
toenail-clippers give police greater constitutional leeway to scan houses?”101 
Kyllo could be described as the most significant contemporary case to raise 
technology-search difficulties. But as promised, here is at least one more, the 
importance of which is that it seemingly revived the Fourth Amendment’s 
property foundation. 
Antoine Jones was suspected of narcotics trafficking, so the 
government placed a GPS tracking system on a vehicle registered to his 
wife.102 The device enabled the government to gather 2,000 pages of data in 
a twenty-eight-day period, and Jones was eventually charged with the 
violation of multiple federal laws.103 When the case arrived to the Supreme 
Court, the majority opinion, authored again by Justice Scalia, found for 
Jones. When the government placed the device on Jones’s vehicle, it 
occupied his private property, a physical intrusion within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment when adopted.104 Because the government’s conduct 
amounted to an intrusion onto a constitutionally protected area—a vehicle, 
undoubtedly one’s “effect” within the meaning of the amendment—a search 
occurred.105 
So, in the world after Jones, property-based notions of the Fourth 
Amendment survive, but they are not the exclusive inquiry. If there’s no 
trespass, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test provides another 
route for those aggrieved by what they claim was a government search. That 
is unless that expectation of privacy regards information held by a third 
party. 
 
 99 Id. at 40. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that “any member of the public might notice that one 
part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby building if, for example, rainwater evaporates or 
snow melts at different rates across its surfaces.” Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 100 Id. at 36 (majority opinion). 
 101 John P. Elwood, What Were They Thinking: The Supreme Court in Revue, October Term 2000, 4 
GREEN BAG 2D 365, 371 (2001); see Amsterdam, supra note 44. 
 102 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012). 
 103 Id. at 403. 
 104 Id. at 404–05. 
 105 Id. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
384 
V. CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES 
Timothy Carpenter and his fellow marauders were likely just trying to 
make a living (albeit dishonestly), rather than lay the groundwork for the 
next significant step in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. But that is exactly 
what happened in the perfect storm that became Carpenter v. United States: 
the confluence of the Katz test, the third-party doctrine, and the problem of 
evolving technology. 
A. The Facts of Carpenter 
After one of Carpenter’s accomplices confessed to their involvement 
with a string of store robberies, prosecutors obtained Carpenter’s cell phone 
records pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, which “permits the 
Government to compel the disclosure of certain telecommunications records 
when it ‘offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe’ that the records sought ‘are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.’”106 A federal magistrate judge 
then issued two orders directing Carpenter’s cell carriers to disclose the cell 
site location information (CSLI) during the four-month period when the 
robberies occurred.107 
B. The Technology of Carpenter 
Now is an appropriate time for a brief aside on CSLI. For a cell phone 
to do nearly anything, it must connect to a cell tower.108 Each time it does, 
the phone generates information stored by the phone company “about which 
tower the phone connected to—essentially where the phone was—on a given 
date and time.”109 These small bits of data create what is called CSLI, which 
is in turn stored by wireless providers.110 The number of cell towers (“cell 
sites”) has increased with the number of cell phones and therefore increased 
the precision of the location information about users.111 Before Carpenter, 
police could use this information, via statues like the Stored 
Communications Act, to reconstruct almost anyone’s movements over a 
period of many months.112 
 
 106 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012)). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Brief for Elec. Frontier Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
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This is a wonderful thing for law enforcement. At least 95% percent of 
Americans own a cell phone, and most take it with them everywhere they 
go.113 In the United States, there are 396 million mobile devices.114 That is 72 
million more cell accounts than people, at least at the end of 2016.115 While 
turned on, cell phones regularly send and receive information from cell 
towers, and each tower has multiple “sites” facing three or four different 
directions, each of which connects the phone to the cellular network.116 The 
user does nothing during this process, as the phone connects to sites 
automatically, moving from tower to tower along with the location of the 
phone (and therefore, the user).117 As cell phone use has continued to expand 
to the general public, so has the presence of cell sites, with now over 300,000 
in the United States alone.118 
Moreover, because smart phones do much more than make calls, they 
transmit and receive a huge amount of data.119 As users switched to smart 
phones, the amount of data transferred over wireless networks increased by 
3,500% from 2010 to 2016.120 And because the amount of cell sites and data 
transferred through them has similarly increased, so too has the accuracy of 
the location information that is generated.121 You can imagine how useful 
this information is for law enforcement looking to find out where a suspect 
has been and when. 
C. The Law of Carpenter 
Back to the case at hand. The Court first considered what to do with 
Smith and Miller. It remarked that the Court in the 1970s—which gifted us 
with the third-party doctrine—could not have comprehended the deeply 
 
 113 Id. at 5 (citing Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org
/fact-sheet/mobile [https://perma.cc/LQ86-SWFB]). 
 114 Id. (citing CTIA, Annual Year-End 2016 Top-Line Survey Results 3 (May 2017) [hereinafter 
CTIA 2016 Survey], https://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/annual-year-
end-2016-top-line-survey-results-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/-E8XT-YHDQ] (reporting 396 million 
“wireless subscriber connections”)). 
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 116 Id. at 6–7 (citing Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part II): Geolocation Privacy 
and Surveillance, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and 
Investigations, of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 50, 53 (Apr. 25, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 
Blaze Testimony] (written testimony of Matt Blaze, Professor, University of Pennsylvania), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg80542/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg80542.pdf [https://
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 119 Id. at 9. 
 120 Id. (citing CTIA 2016 Survey at 3 (reporting 388 billion megabytes in 2010 and 13,719 billion 
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 121 Id. at 10–12. 
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revealing nature of CSLI.122 Because of that “unique nature,” the Court held 
that the third-party doctrine does not apply to CSLI.123 So a search occurred 
when the Government obtained Carpenter’s CSLI.124 And because that search 
did not occur pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause—but rather, 
the Stored Communications Act, which requires a showing “well short” of 
probable cause—it was unreasonable and thus unconstitutional.125 
One proposition underpinning the holding is that a person generally has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical 
movements.126 Historically, it was difficult and costly for law enforcement to 
embark on such comprehensive tracking, so it is reasonable that society 
expects law enforcement would not catalogue their every movement.127 But 
now, as in its pursuit of Mr. Carpenter, the government can obtain a time-
stamped record of an individual’s movement—revealing their familial, 
political, professional, and religious affiliations—in an easy, cheap, and 
efficient way.128 That, the Court said, offends reasonable expectations of 
privacy.129 Worse yet, “[w]ith access to CSLI, the Government can now 
travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts, subject only to the 
retention policies of the wireless carriers, which currently maintain records 
for up to five years.”130 This sort of “tireless and absolute” surveillance, to 
the Court, was too far,131 so it held that “when the Government accessed CSLI 
from the wireless carriers, it invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the whole of his physical movements.”132 
At this point, a dispassionate observer might be wondering how the 
third-party doctrine’s legs were so easily swept from beneath it. After all, at 
first glance, there does not appear to be any daylight between the sort of 
“business record” obtained by the government in Smith and Miller, and the 
CSLI obtained here: information kept by the service provider in the course 
of its business. This was the Government’s position in Carpenter.133 It urged 
 
 122 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
 123 Id. 
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that, at bottom, the legal question here “turns on a garden-variety request for 
information from a third-party witness.”134 
The Court responded that such a position “fails to contend with the 
seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the tracking of not 
only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s, not for a short period but 
for years and years.”135 To the Court, there is a “world of difference” between 
CSLI and the information at issue in Smith and Miller.136 But is there? Again, 
the Court’s particular qualm with CSLI is that it reveals familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.137 And few would disagree 
that around-the-clock tracking, whether geographically or through a user’s 
“digital footprint,” does indeed reveal such things. But is it obvious that 
one’s bank statement does not? Hardly. 
Sensing technology’s tendency for rapid development, and in line with 
its observation that “the rule the Court adopts must take account of more 
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development,” the Court 
emphasized the narrowness of its holding.138 The Court confined its rule to 
CSLI-type data and did “not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or 
call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as 
security cameras,” nor did it “address other business records that might 
incidentally reveal location information.”139 
D. Response to Carpenter 
The dissenters were less than impressed. Justice Kennedy suggested 
that “the Court’s stark departure from relevant Fourth Amendment 
precedents and principles is, in my submission, unnecessary and 
incorrect.”140 Justice Thomas’s chief complaint was that the majority “use[d] 
the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test,” which “has no basis in the text 
or history of the Fourth Amendment. And, it invites courts to make 
judgments about policy, not law.”141 Justice Alito criticized the opinion for 
fracturing “two fundamental pillars of Fourth Amendment law, and in doing 
so, [guaranteeing] a blizzard of litigation while threatening many legitimate 
and valuable investigative practices upon which law enforcement has 
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rightfully come to rely.”142 Finally, Justice Gorsuch added that the opinion 
leaves lower courts with “two amorphous balancing tests, a series of weighty 
and incommensurable principles to consider in them, and a few illustrative 
examples that seem little more than the product of judicial intuition.”143 
On the other hand, the gallery was quite pleased. Various media 
characterized the decision as “a win for digital privacy advocates” that would 
have “implications for all sorts of information held by third parties, including 
browsing data, text messages, emails, and bank records.”144 Enthusiasm was 
not in short supply, as some suggested that Carpenter was a “groundbreaking 
victory for privacy rights in the digital age”145 and “a big win for privacy 
advocates” that “will likely have important consequences for cases across 
the country.”146 
VI. SUGGESTED THEORIES OF FOURTH AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION 
If Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has anything going for it, it is that 
there is no dearth of suggested interpretations. What proceeds are a couple 
of those suggestions. 
A. The Four Models of the Fourth Amendment 
One mode of Fourth Amendment interpretation is really a collection of 
models for determining whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in a given case. It suggests that “no one test effectively and consistently 
distinguishes the more troublesome police practices that require Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny from the less troublesome practices that do not.”147 This 
theory envisions that courts deciding whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists in a particular case can choose from a toolbox of four distinct 
methods of answering that question.148 Those four tools (or models) are 
deemed as follows: (1) Probabilistic, (2) Private Facts, (3) Positive Law, and 
(4) Policy.149 
 
 142 Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 143 Id. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 144 Louise Matsakis, The Supreme Court Just Greatly Strengthened Digital Privacy, WIRED (June 
22, 2018, 12:26 PM) https://www.wired.com/story/carpenter-v-united-states-supreme-court-digital-
privacy/ [https://perma.cc/8XJQ-49SJ]. 
 145 Carol Rose, U.S. Supreme Court Issues Groundbreaking Victory for Privacy Rights, ACLU 
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 146 Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Supreme Court Strengthens Digital Privacy, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
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 147 Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (2007). 
 148 Id. at 549–50. 
 149 Id. at 508–22. 
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Under the Probabilistic Model, “a reasonable expectation of privacy 
depends on the chance that a sensible person would predict that he would 
maintain his privacy.”150 This model relies on “social practices” to consider 
the likelihood that a person will be observed or a place investigated.151 Thus, 
“a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy when the odds are very 
high that others will not successfully pry into his affairs.”152 The odds of 
exposure are in an inverse relationship with the reasonableness of the 
expectation of privacy.153 It is argued that, as with the other three models, the 
Court has already deployed this model before.154 
Next, the Private Facts Model “focuses on the information the 
government collects, and considers whether that information is private and 
worthy of constitutional protection.”155 Under this approach, when the 
government obtains information that is especially private, the acquisition of 
that information constitutes a search—however, if the information collected 
is not private or does not otherwise merit protection, then no search has 
occurred.156 The focus of this inquiry is the substance of a search rather than 
the procedure of it.157 
The third approach, called the Positive Law Model, is one in which the 
court looks at “whether there is some law that prohibits or restricts the 
government’s action (other than the Fourth Amendment itself).”158 The 
government violates reasonable expectations of privacy when it breaks the 
 
 150 Id. at 508. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 508–09. 
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 154 E.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (holding that a law enforcement 
officer’s physical manipulation of opaque bag that passenger carried onto cross-country bus and placed 
in rack directly above his seat violated Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches of 
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in upper part of duplex, had legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises which was protected by 
Fourth Amendment and, thus, had standing to challenge warrantless entry to effect his arrest). 
 155 Kerr, supra note147, at 512. 
 156 Id. at 512–13. 
 157 Id. at 513; see, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1986) (holding that 
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Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (explaining that even when government agents may lawfully seize a 
sealed package to prevent loss or destruction of suspected contraband, the Fourth Amendment requires 
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 158 Kerr, supra note 147, at 516. 
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law in order to obtain information.159 Often, this question, under this 
approach, turns on whether the information collected was legally available 
to the public: “If a member of the public could have accessed the information 
legally, then it does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy for the 
government to do the same.”160 Like the other models, there are examples 
where the Court has followed what looks like the Positive Law Model.161 
Lastly, the Policy Model asks “should a particular set of police practices 
be regulated by the warrant requirement or should those practices remain 
unregulated by the Fourth Amendment?”162 This model envisions judges as 
policymakers: 
If the consequences of leaving conduct unregulated are particularly troublesome 
to civil liberties, then that conduct violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
On the other hand, if the practical consequences of regulating such conduct 
unnecessarily restrict government investigations given the gain to civil liberties 
protection, then any expectation of privacy is constitutionally unreasonable.163 
Therefore, in these circumstances, whether an “expectation of privacy is 
reasonable hinges on a normative value judgment.”164 It is argued that this 
model was on display in Katz and Kyllo.165 
B. The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment 
While inspired by the model mentioned above,166 this Positive Law 
Model is different.167 It asks whether a government actor has done something 
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that would be unlawful for a similarly situated nongovernment actor to do.168 
In other words, “the Fourth Amendment is triggered if the officer—stripped 
of official authority—could not lawfully act as he or she did.”169 Under this 
approach, a search happens when (1) a government actor violates a law that 
applies to both government and private actors; and (2) the government actor 
has taken advantage of an exception for government officials.170 
At first blush, some may accuse the Positive Law Model of being a mere 
recast of the original, property-based notions of the Fourth Amendment. But 
this model is distinct in that it draws on all bodies of the positive law to 
determine whether a search has occurred, not just property law.171 Moreover, 
in stark contrast to the Court’s use of general, conceptualized property 
notions before—those that “borrow[ed] the general look and feel of 
trespassory actions”—the Positive Law Model would formally incorporate 
actual positive law, chapter and verse, to determine “whether the officials in 
question were doing something that ordinary people would have gotten into 
legal trouble for doing in like circumstances.”172 
VII. BACK TO BASICS 
As to where we should go from here, I submit that courts first determine 
what the Fourth Amendment meant when it was ratified and then apply that 
meaning in a straightforward way to new phenomena that exist today. If that 
leaves us dissatisfied, then our choices are to amend the Constitution or enact 
positive law to manifest our normative goals. But subverting our 
constitutional structure is not a viable choice, despite the challenge that 
technology may present to Fourth Amendment questions. This is based on a 
few assumed values: the necessity of neutral principles, a law of rules, 
institutionalism and the separation of powers, and the Fourth Amendment’s 
text. Following, I will explain each value and its application here. 
A. The Necessity of Neutral Principles 
The first premise should be noncontroversial. It is that in all cases, 
especially those of constitutional law, the question of whether to laud or 
condemn the Court’s decision cannot turn on “whether its result in the 
immediate decision seems to hinder or advance the interests or the values” 
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that one favors.173 If such were the rubric for appraisal, many may favor the 
decision in Carpenter for its protection of digital privacy; the merits of the 
Court’s rationale fall into the background amid the immediate result—the 
striking down of an intrusive government search. The same can be said for 
Katz: most people balk at the suggestion that the government may listen in 
on their phone calls without implicating the Fourth Amendment. 
Understandably so. 
But adoration for substantive outcomes should not mean sweeping 
procedural considerations into the dustbin: substantive outcomes, as in the 
legal result reached in the case, and procedural considerations, as in the 
method by which the court arrived at the particular substantive outcome. The 
dictate asserted here is that the method by which a result is reached must be 
based on neutral principles—those that rest “on reasons with respect to all 
the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality 
transcend any immediate result that is involved.”174 After their adoption, “the 
principles must be applied ‘neutrally’—that is, consistently in comparable 
situations. . . . [O]nce the Court has chosen a generalizably applicable 
principle of interpretation for a particular constitutional provision,” such as 
the Fourth Amendment, “it may not selectively ignore that principle,” like 
the third-party doctrine, “in a particular case, merely because it does not like 
the specific result in that case.”175 
Carpenter, scrutinized under this rubric, leaves something to be desired. 
One “cannot fault the Sixth Circuit for holding that Smith and Miller 
extinguish any Katz-based Fourth Amendment interest in third party cell-site 
data,” because that “is the plain effect of their categorical holdings.”176 
Blindfolded to the implications on the ground, it is difficult to answer why 
the third-party doctrine’s straightforward application did not dispose of Mr. 
Carpenter’s arguments—at least legally speaking. But the Court—perhaps 
sensing how distasteful it would be to conclude that under its current 
precedents, the Government was not in error—opted for an “implicit but 
unmistakable conclusion that the rationale of Smith and Miller is wrong.”177 
Surely, the pace of justice, like that of the turtle, is slow and steady. Yet it is 
hard to not feel let down that the Court seems to have intentionally walked 
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the batter instead of taking the more aggressive step of trying to strike it out 
for all time. The intentional walk may be the more prudent and strategic 
move in the long game. But some would rather see the head-on collision: if 
it is the case that the third-party doctrine is wrong—as the majority implicitly 
indicated—then get rid of it. 
Some may understandably suggest that, at least in the context of digital 
privacy, “there are certain political results that are to be preferred, and legal 
principle must be circumvented to achieve these normative ends.”178 After 
all, a majority of Americans, for instance, oppose government bulk 
collection of citizen data, and two thirds believe there are not sufficient limits 
on the types of data that can be collected.179 But dispensing with legal 
principle to constitutionalize favorable policy reduces the judicial process to 
a political state of nature, a war of all against all, where, as Hobbes warned, 
life is “nasty, brutish and short.”180 At the end, Carpenter is difficult to 
defend if committed to consistent and neutral principles of decision. 
B. A Law of Rules 
Justice Scalia, in his exploration of the dichotomy between the “general 
rule of law” and the “personal discretion to do justice,” shared a story of 
Louis IX of France: 
In summer, after hearing mass, the king often went to the wood of Vincennes, 
where he would sit down with his back against an oak, and make us all sit round 
him. Those who had any suit to present could come to speak to him without 
hindrance from an usher or any other person. The king would address them 
directly, and ask: “Is there anyone here who has a case to be settled?” Those 
who had one would stand up. Then he would say: “Keep silent all of you, and 
you shall be heard in turn, one after the other.”181 
At that point, a judgment would be rendered, and it would be binding.182 But 
that is not how justice ought to be done in the United States, because here, 
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the law is king—the final sovereign.183 Two precepts support this taste for 
bright-line rules as opposed to narrow, exception-based holdings, and both 
are offended by Carpenter’s holding. 
First, a law of rules serves equal treatment. “When a case is accorded a 
different disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if the system of 
justice is to be respected, not only that the latter case be different, but that it 
be seen to be so.”184 If not, litigants might doubt that they have received a 
fair shake. This notion strikes at the heart of a sense of justice innate in most 
from birth: that the rules should be the same for everyone. In Carpenter still, 
this sensibility is hardly offended, because the judgment resulted in a private-
citizen-defendant’s victory—not the converse, where the state-as-villain 
wins against the defendant who has substantially less resources and 
knowhow. But surely, most would agree that the proposition that “the rules 
should be the same for everyone” cuts both ways, notwithstanding who is a 
party to the litigation. And it will not always be the case that parting with the 
rules favors the little guy. Had the pronouncement in Carpenter been to 
convict the criminal defendant by dispensing with a longstanding rule that 
clearly applied and would have saved the day, red flags would have 
understandably been raised. 
The second precept is that our judiciary is a hierarchical system. The 
Supreme Court announces its judgment, which is followed by the courts of 
appeals, the district courts, and the state courts when ruling on federal issues. 
When the Court decides issues narrowly, as it did in Carpenter, the lower 
courts are given little with which to work. 
Recall that from the Republic’s inception to the mid-twentieth century, 
the Fourth Amendment was based in property concepts. Then, the “premise 
that property interests control the right of the Government to search and 
seize” was “discredited,”185 and the Court invented the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, which was followed quickly by the third-party 
doctrine. Then, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Fourth 
Amendment’s property origins were revived. Now, Carpenter carves out 
what appears to be a narrow exception to the third-party doctrine—if not an 
implicit repeal of it—but the Court, in its own words, does not comment on 
“real-time CSLI,” “tower dumps,”186 “the application of Smith and Miller,” 
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“conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras,” 
or “other business records that might incidentally reveal location 
information.”187 
In this way, Carpenter raises more questions than it answers, and lower 
courts are left with little to guide them.188 The result is a grant of the 
discretion to do justice, like Louis IX of France sitting under a summertime 
tree, taking each case as it comes, at which point a value judgment follows. 
But that is not the system we were given by the Framers, nor should it be the 
system that we want. Carpenter misses the mark if our ultimate end is a law 
of rules. 
C. Institutionalism and the Separation of Powers 
The next principle is what might be called institutionalism—or instead, 
a healthy respect for the separation of powers. With institutionalism, a court 
confronted with a doctrinal issue “must initially inquire whether that issue 
has already been resolved by the political branches in the form of legislation. 
In other words, it must first ask whether the judiciary is the appropriate 
governmental institution, under the circumstances, to make that normative 
policy choice.”189 This view holds that, while the federal judiciary’s 
insulation from the political accountability enables it to enforce the counter-
majoritarian Constitution, as a corollary, it requires “a substantial degree of 
political humility when engaging in the sub-constitutional process of 
statutory interpretation.”190 
Here, I take this theory one step further to suggest that the judiciary’s 
insulation from political accountability also requires it to exercise political 
humility in the form of fidelity to the written Constitution as ratified. Like 
the institutionalism described above, this too finds its roots in American 
political theory: “In a representative democracy, it is not the role of the 
unrepresentative and unaccountable federal courts to ignore, undermine, or 
reject” clear constitutional dictates.191 Indeed, “a fundamentally democratic 
society assumes as its ultimate normative political premise some notion of 
self-determination,” so it follows that we ought to accord respect to 
constitutional exercises of democratic will.192 But similarly, the same respect 
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should be accorded when the people “prescribe specific normative principles 
of governmental behavior beyond the reach of simple majoritarian 
processes” through codification in the Constitution.193 
This is fundamental to our system. “The People, through ratification, 
have already weighed the policy tradeoffs that constitutional rights entail,” 
and those tradeoffs are not for the Court to reconsider or balance.194 The 
Framers “knew that judges, like other government officers, could not always 
be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people,” and therefore “were loath to 
leave too much discretion in judicial hands.”195 These observations distill to 
the notion that no court has authority to “unilaterally alter” the Constitution 
that the people approved, especially when interpretive alterations are based 
on the Court’s sense of whether the rights codified are too broad or narrow 
for modern times.196 This is not the role of the courts, yet it is exactly what 
Katz asks of them. Thereby, the doctrine is inconsistent with the structure of 
our government. This is why any theory of Fourth Amendment interpretation 
that leaves room for the courts to make value judgments must be declined. It 
is not for judges to mold or “new-model” the law.197 Judges have but one job, 
which is to say what the law is.198 It was Hamilton who described that liberty 
“‘ha[s] every thing to fear from [the] union’ of the judicial and legislative 
powers.”199 
D. The Fourth Amendment’s Text 
The final point is the Fourth Amendment’s text. Notwithstanding the 
method of interpretation to which one commits themselves, we can hopefully 
all agree that the Court’s constitutional interpretation may “never contradict 
the document’s unambiguous textual maxims, regardless of any particular 
Justice’s agreement or disagreement with the sociopolitical value of those 
directives.”200 So to begin, we can read the words of the Fourth Amendment 
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to figure out, at the least, what it “cannot reasonably be construed to 
mean.”201 
1. What the Fourth Amendment Does Not Say 
The Fourth Amendment’s text protects the “right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”202 By process of elimination then, we know that the 
Fourth Amendment protects no thing that cannot be reasonably construed as 
a person, house, paper, or effect. 
This exclusion leaves no room for the Katz test. If a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is found in a thing enumerated in the Amendment, the 
test is superfluous. If a reasonable expectation of privacy is found in a thing 
not enumerated in the Amendment, or if no reasonable expectation of privacy 
is found in a thing that is enumerated in the Amendment, it is in clear 
contradiction with the text. After all, we know that the word “search” and 
the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” had no legal association at all 
before Katz.203 Further, with Katz must go its outgrowths, including the third-
party doctrine—either something is yours under the Amendment and thus 
constitutionally protected, or it is not. The analysis need not be more 
complicated than that. 
This principle must also result in disqualifying the Positive Law Model 
because the “text of the Fourth Amendment cannot plausibly be read to mean 
‘any violation of positive law’ any more than it can plausibly be read to mean 
‘any violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.’”204 Administrable as 
it is, the Positive Law Model fails for its lack of grounding in the text of the 
Amendment. Positive law may be a factor, but it cannot be the factor. 
2. What the Fourth Amendment Does Say 
It is easy to say what the text does not mean. Ascertaining with 
confidence what it does mean is quite another undertaking. Difficulties exist 
in determining what the words meant at the time of ratification and how they 
embrace new phenomena now, but we are not totally lost. 
We know that “search” was probably not a term of art, and that its 
meaning to the founding generation was the same as it is today: “[t]o look 
over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine 
 
 201 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 202 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 203 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The phrase 
‘expectation(s) of privacy’ does not appear in the pre-Katz federal or state case reporters, the papers of 
prominent Founders, early congressional documents and debates, collections of early American English 
texts, or early American newspapers.”). 
 204 Id. at 2242. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
398 
by inspection.”205 Regarding the categories of things protected by the 
Amendment, while we are not certain, we may be confident that “the 
available linguistic and statutory evidence suggests that ‘persons, houses, 
papers, and effects’ was understood to provide clear protection for houses, 
personal papers, the sorts of domestic and personal items associated with 
houses, and even commercial products or goods that might be stored in 
houses—while leaving commercial premises and interests otherwise subject 
to congressional discretion.”206 
Furthermore, we know that to come within the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment, something must be yours. “The obvious meaning of the 
provision is that each person has the right to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures in his own person, house, papers, and effects.”207 This 
culminates to the constitutional dictate that a search occurs when the 
government looks over or through your person, your house, your personal 
papers, or your effects, and that tent of protection also includes personal 
items and commercial products. 
3. What the Fourth Amendment Says About Technology 
Surely, there still exists what some see as a problem: technology and 
the Amendment’s mooring to property-trespass concepts. Perhaps one might 
conclude, on a strict construction of the Amendment’s text and history, that, 
when the government uses the latest and greatest tech to look straight through 
the wall of your home and into your living room, no search has occurred 
since it has not physically trespassed. This would seemingly be an extension 
of the notion that “the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a 
trespass.”208 But the Fourth Amendment’s trespass foundation is based on 
“actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,” not technical 
trespass.209 To intrude is “to thrust oneself in without invitation, permission, 
or welcome.”210 It does not seem too much of a stretch to suggest that the 
Government intrudes when it uses technology to place itself into a 
constitutionally protected area, such as your home, and thus a search occurs. 
Moreover, whether or not the technology used by the Government to achieve 
this is in general public use ought to command no weight at all—a search is 
a search. We need not confine ourselves to only phenomena that existed at 
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the time of the founding, and new phenomena ought not drive us away from 
principled constitutional analysis. Even Justice Scalia, ever the originalist, 
supported this notion.211 
What about the not-so-clear cases, such as Carpenter? The instances 
where we entrust our information to a third party, or where the third party 
creates data about us without much involvement from us at all? 
Straightforward application of the Amendment may still suffice. Recall that 
the Amendment is animated when something is yours, and falls into one of 
the four buckets enumerated in the Amendment. More importantly, a third 
party’s access “to or possession of your papers and effects does not 
necessarily eliminate your interest in them.”212 This derives from the concept 
of bailment: “delivery of a thing in trust for some special object or purpose, 
and upon a contract, expressed or implied, to conform to the object or 
purpose of the trust.”213 As such, entrusting a thing that is “yours” to someone 
else does not deprive you of a property interest in that thing. 
This principle can be extended to most data-related questions, with the 
view that your data—whether it be in the cloud, on your phone, or collected 
by your wireless provider—is the modern-day equivalent of your “papers 
and effects.”214 This remains true even if you happen to share control of such 
data with your wireless provider. Absolute ownership and control is not a 
precondition to the Fourth Amendment’s protection: “People call a house 
‘their’ home when legal title is in the bank, when they rent it, and even when 
they merely occupy it rent free.”215 The best part is that none of this requires 
mangling the text or fundamentally changing its substance. 
CONCLUSION 
Simple application of the Fourth Amendment’s terms, even with its 
property foundation, will not render it irrelevant nor give rise to an 
Orwellian-surveillance state. The Amendment’s jurisprudence only ventured 
so far off course when the Court strayed from its clear textual dictates. 
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Imagine that your vehicle’s GPS malfunctioned, instructing you to take a left 
turn when you should have taken a right, only for you to realize miles and 
miles later. Would you continue to charge forward down that path? Or would 
you accept the inevitable conclusion that you had been led astray, then course 
correct, turning back the way you came? It is okay for us to humbly accept 
that the Katz experiment and its progeny are a failure, and that it is time for 
us to turn back around. 
By no means do I endeavor to provide a complete exegesis on the 
original Fourth Amendment—yet any meaningful constitutional 
interpretation must account for the text and history. Rather, I write in support 
of a Fourth Amendment course correction, and the proposition that when it 
comes to the meaning of the text when ratified, we are not totally lost. Upon 
studied care, we may discern a reasonably clear path going forward—one 
faithful to the Fourth Amendment’s text, history, and meaning, as well as our 
system of government. 
At bottom, fidelity to our constitutional structure and the role of the 
judiciary should drive us to take the Fourth Amendment for what it says, not 
what we wish it would say. Our carefully devised system of disbursed powers 
is too important to deconstruct for the sake of changing a provision that 
becomes politically unpopular. If we take issue with the protection that the 
Fourth Amendment affords, the proper course is to amend the provision or 
charge the branch most directly accountable to the people with protecting 
privacy by way of legislation. The answer is not to repose the responsibility 
of determining what the text ought to say in an unelected and politically 
unaccountable judiciary. 
